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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses joint criminal enterprise doctrine. In particular, this
memorandum examines the issue of where an ongoing joint criminal enterprise exists, what is
necessary to bring about its termination as a matter of law or to terminate an individual’s
membership in the joint criminal enterprise. Individuals accused of conspiracy, which is similar
to joint criminal enterprise doctrine in many ways, can limit their criminal liability by showing
their withdrawal from the conspiracy or by showing that the conspiracy has terminated. This
memorandum will explore how the aforementioned defenses to conspiracy could be used in the
context of joint criminal enterprise.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Withdrawal Is Not Effective Defenses for Individuals Accused of
Participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise.
Domestic conspiracy law provides the closest analogy to joint criminal enterprise
doctrine. Those accused of conspiracy can limit their liability by showing that they withdrew
from the conspiracy. This can either limit liability for substantive crimes committed after the
individual’s withdrawal or limit liability by showing that the statute of limitations has run since
the individual’s withdrawal. This defense has little application to joint criminal enterprise
doctrine because if an accused is found to have the requisite mens rea and actus reus, he is liable
for all crimes committed pursuant to the common plan. Also, an accused cannot benefit from the
running of a statute of limitations because the ICTY has jurisdiction over any crimes provided
for in the statute that occurred in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. However, an
individual can escape criminal liability for crimes committed in the context of a systemic joint
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criminal enterprise by showing that the crimes occurred either before his arrival or after his
departure from the prison camp.
2. Termination Is Not Effective Defenses for Individuals Accused of
Participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise.
Those accused of conspiracy can also limit their liability by showing that the conspiracy
terminated. This can limit liability for substantive crimes committed after the termination or
limit liability by showing that the statute of limitations has run since the termination of the
conspiracy. This defense has little application to joint criminal enterprise doctrine because if an
accused is found to have the requisite mens rea and actus reus, he is liable for all crimes
committed pursuant to the common plan. Once again, an accused cannot benefit from the
running of a statute of limitations because no such statute of limitation is in place in the ICTY.
3. Although Withdrawal and Termination do not provide effective defenses
against the application of joint criminal enterprise doctrine, there are other
ways in which an accused can show that a joint criminal enterprise did not
exist.
This can be accomplished by showing a lack of an agreement between the accused and
the physical perpetrators of the crimes. This precedent was established by the Brdjanin
Judgment. There the Trial Chamber significantly restricted the application of the joint criminal
enterprise doctrine. This precedent limits the size of potential the joint criminal enterprise
because now there must be an agreement between the accused and the people who actually
commit the crimes. It is also possible to show that a joint criminal enterprise does not exist as a
matter of law where the Indictment does not sufficiently identify the member of the enterprise or
make their identification possible.
It is possible for an individual to show that he was not a member of a joint criminal
enterprise by showing that he lacked the necessary mens rea to be criminally liable under the
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doctrine. In this instance it is still possible to be criminally liable as an aider and abettor. This
scenario is demonstrated by the Vasiljevic Decision. It is also possible for an individual to
demonstrate that he was not a member of a joint criminal enterprise by showing that his
contribution was not substantial enough for criminal liability to attach.

3

II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Joint Criminal Enterprise Cases
The joint criminal enterprise doctrine has been applied by international criminal tribunals
throughout the twentieth century. The Essen Lynching case is an important example of an early
case applying the joint criminal enterprise doctrine.1 That case, before a British military court,
concerned the lynching of three British prisoners of war on December 13, 1944. Two German
servicemen and five German civilians were charged with committing a war crime because they
were concerned in the killing of the British prisoners.2
German Captain Erich Heyer assigned a German soldier the task of escorting the British
prisoners to a Luftwaffe unit for interrogation. As the prisoners were marched through the
streets of Essen, the crowd of civilians began to hit them and throw sticks and stones at them.
When the prisoners reached a bridge, they were thrown off of it. The fall killed one of the
prisoners and the two remaining prisoners were either shot or kicked and beaten to death by
members of the crowd. 3
The Defense stressed that in order for the Defendants to be liable for the killings, the
prosecution must show that each Defendant had the intent to kill.4 The Prosecution argued that
each defendant was “concerned in the killing” of the prisoners, so under British law, they would
be guilty of either murder or manslaughter.5 The prosecution added, “every person in that crowd

1

Trial of Erich Heyer and Six others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, 18th-19th and
21st-22nd December, 1945 UNWCC, vol. 1, p. 88. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
2

The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999
at para. 207. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
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Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

4

who struck a blow is both morally and criminally responsible for the deaths of those three men.”6
The Court agreed with the rationale of the Prosecution. This is evident because seven
Defendants were found guilty of the murder of the prisoners. The Court upheld the idea that
although not all of the guilty defendants intended to kill the prisoners, they all intended to
participate in the unlawful ill treatment of the prisoners. They were “concerned in the killing of
the prisoners, so they were found guilty of murder. The Court inferred that the convicted
Defendants who struck the prisoners or implicitly incited the murder could have foreseen that
others would kill the prisoners, and for this reason they were found guilty.7 The Court in the
Tadic case relied on this precedent to establish support for the application of the joint criminal
enterprise doctrine.8
A United States military court took a similar position to the Essen Lynching case in Kurt
Goebell et al. a.k.a. the Borkum Island case. The Tadic Court cited the Borkum Island case to
gather further support for the joint criminal enterprise doctrine.9 In that case, a United States
Flying Fortress was forced down on the German island of Borkum. The plane’s seven
crewmembers were taken prisoner and forced to march through the streets of Borkum where they
were beat by members of the Reich's Labour Corps and German civilians, who beat them with
shovels, upon the order of a German officer. The escorting guards did not protect the prisoners;

6

Trial of Erich Heyer and Six others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, 18th-19th and
21st-22nd December, 1945 UNWCC, vol. 1, p. 88.
7

See generally The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999

8

Id.

9

Id. at para. 210
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rather they fostered the assault and took part in the beating. When the prisoners reached the city
hall they were all shot and killed by German soldiers.10
The Defendants were charged with "willfully, deliberately and wrongfully encourag[ing],
aid[ing], abett[ing] and participat[ing] in the killing" of the airmen and with "willfully,
deliberately and wrongfully encourag[ing], aid[ing], abett[ing] and participat[ing] in assaults
upon" the airmen.11 Not all of the Defendants participated in the crimes in the same manner.
However,
“the ultimate act might have been something in which the former actor did not
directly participate [,e]very time a member of a mob takes any action that is
inclined to encourage, that is inclined to give heart to someone else who is
present, to participate, then that person has lent his aid to the accomplishment of
the final result.”12
The Prosecutor argued that the Defendants were "cogs in the wheel of common design, all
equally important, each cog doing the part assigned to it. And the wheel of wholesale murder
could not turn without all the cogs."13 If it is proven that “each one of these accused played his
part in mob violence which led to the unlawful killing of the seven American flyers, ... under the
law each and every one of the accused is guilty of murder.''14
Six Defendants were found guilty on charges of the killing and the assault.15 Eight
Defendants were found guilty of just the assault.16 The Defendants who were found guilty were

10

Id.

11

See Kurt Goebell at al. Charge Sheet, in U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publications, (on file with the
International Tribunal’s Library) [Tab 7]
12

Id. at para. 1186

13

Id. at para. 1190

14

Id.

15

The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999
at para. 268
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held responsible for pursuing a criminal common design. Their guilt regarding the murders
presumably stemmed from the fact that their status, role or conduct placed them in a position
where they could have predicted that the assault would lead to the killing of the victims by other
members of the mob.17 Those who were found guilty were held responsible for pursuing a
common criminal design. They had the intent to assault the prisoners, and for those found guilty
of murder, it was foreseeable that the murders would occur.18 This case provides another
example of an early application of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine, or a doctrine quite
similar to it. This precedent was sighted by the Tadic court to marshal support for their
application of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine to the ICTY.
B. Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute
The joint criminal enterprise doctrine has now been clearly established as a mode of
criminal liability in ICTY jurisprudence. It has been routinely utilized by the prosecution in a
wide array of cases, most notably against former President Slobodan Milosevic.19 The form of
liability known as "joint criminal enterprise" or "common plan" is not explicitly described in the
ICTY Statute, however, the judges have found that it is implicitly included in the language of
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.20 Under this form of liability, an individual may be held
responsible for all crimes committed pursuant to the existence of a common plan or design

16

Id. at para. 269

17

Id. at note 213

18

Id.

19

Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. Int'l
Crim. Just. 606 at 619(June 2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35]

20

Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, Cal. L. Rev. (Jan. 2005) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 36]
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provided that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes alleged.21 It fell to the
Judges of the ICTY, through both Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber decisions, to identify,
articulate and define this 'new' basis of criminal liability.22
Article 7(1) of the ICTY provides that “1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.”23 Although the ICTY Statute does not specifically mention joint criminal enterprise as a
crime, the ICTY has noted that all those who have engaged in serious violations of international
humanitarian law, whatever the manner in which they may have perpetrated, or participated in
the perpetration of those violations, must be brought to justice.24 The Statute does not confine
itself to providing for jurisdiction over those persons who plan, instigate, order, physically
perpetrate a crime or otherwise aid and abet in its planning, preparation or execution. The ICTY
Statute does not exclude modes of participating in the commission of crimes that occur where
21

Id.

22

Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. Int'l
Crim. Just. 606 at 606(June 2004) This is not ideal -- criminal law, especially international criminal law, requires
clear and certain definitions of the various bases of liability, so as to enable the parties, both the prosecution and,
perhaps more importantly, the defense, to prepare for and conduct a trial.

23

Statute of the ICTY [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49]

(Article 2 states that the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, namely the following acts against persons or property; willful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried
out unlawfully and wantonly, compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power,
willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian, taking civilians as hostages.)
(Article 5 states that the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes
when committed against any civilian population in an international or internal armed conflict; murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds, other inhumane acts.)
24

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999 at para. 190
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several persons having a common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried out
either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes to the
commission of crimes by the group of persons or some members of the group, in execution of a
common criminal purpose, may be held to be criminally liable.25
An accused’s participation in a joint criminal enterprise does not constitute a crime
merely because of that person’s membership in the organization. The accused is not to be
considered a mere accomplice or aider and abettor. The Appeals Chamber in the Ojdanic
Decision held that co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise is a form of commission pursuant
to Article 7(1) of the Statute, rather than as a form of accomplice liability. A participant shares
the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise, as opposed to merely knowing about it. He or she
cannot be regarded as a mere aider and abettor to the crime that is contemplated. The Appeals
Chamber regards joint criminal enterprise as a form of “commission” pursuant to Article 7(1) of
the Statute.26
Furthermore, criminal liability under a theory of joint criminal enterprise is not liability
simply from an individual’s membership in a criminal enterprise. Post World War II war crimes
tribunals had the ability to punish defendants who knowingly and voluntarily were members of
organizations that committed crimes on a wide scale. No such offense was included in the ICTY
Statute. Only natural persons, as opposed to entities are liable under the ICTY Statute, and mere
membership in a particular criminal organization does not establish individual criminal
responsibility.27

25

Id.

26

The Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision, 21 May 2003, at para.
20. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]

27

Id. at para. 25

9

C. The Tadic Judgment
The Tadic Judgment is seen as the starting point for joint criminal enterprise liability in
the ICTY. The context of Tadic helps explain the early development of joint criminal enterprise.
Tadic was an enthusiastic but relatively low-level participant in the crimes that occurred in
Bosnia in the early 1990s. In 1995 the ICTY Prosecutor indicted Tadic on a number of charges.
At trial, he was convicted of several counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was
acquitted of one of the most serious charges, murder as a crime against humanity. He had been
indicted for the murder of five Muslim men in the Bosnian village of Jaskici. The Trial Chamber
found that Tadic was a member of a group of armed men who entered Jaskici and beat its
inhabitants. The Trial Chamber noted that the five victims, who were alive when the armed
group entered the town, were found shot to death after the group's departure. In the end, the Trial
Chamber determined that it could not based on the evidence, they were not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused was involved in the killing of the five men. It also found that
the deaths occurred at the same time as a larger force of Serb soldiers was involved in an ethnic
cleansing operation in a neighboring village.28
The Prosecution appealed Tadic’s acquittal of the charge of killing the five men. The
Prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber had misapplied the test of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Prosecution.29 They concluded that "the only
reasonable conclusion the Trial Chamber could have drawn is that the armed group to which
[Tadic] belonged killed the five men."30

28

Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, Cal. L. Rev. at 104 (Jan. 2005)

29

Id.

30

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, at para. 183
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The Appeals Chamber then decided whether Tadic could be found guilty of the killing
the five men, despite the lack of proof that he had personally shot them. The Appeals Chamber
first reviewed the language of Article 7(1).31 It noted that the forms of liability contained in that
described "first and foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself," it also
noted that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal "might also occur through
participation in the realisation of a common design or purpose."32 To determine the relevant
requirements for common purpose liability, the Appeals Chamber also looked to customary
international law, which it derived chiefly from case law of military courts set up in the wake of
World War II (the Essen Lynching Case and the Borkum Island Case).
The Appeals Chamber also established that "the notion of common purpose encompasses
three distinct categories of collective criminality."33 The Tadic Judgment discussed these three
distinct categories of joint criminal enterprise, as well as the requisite actus rea and mens rea for
each of the categories.34
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The Three Categories of Joint Criminal Enterprise
1. Basic Joint Criminal Enterprise
The first category of joint criminal enterprise established by the Appeals Chamber in
Tadic, also referred to as basic joint criminal enterprise, deals with cases where all co-defendants
act pursuant to a common design and possess the same criminal intent.35 An example of this

31

Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez at para 105

32

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999 at para. 188.

33

Id. at para. 195.

34

See generally Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999.

35

Id. at para. 196.
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would be if the co-perpetrators of the joint criminal enterprise formulate a plan to commit
murder. In carrying out this common design they all possess the intent to kill. It does not matter
if each co-perpetrator carries out a different act within the common design.36 In order for
criminal liability to attach, the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the common
design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by providing material
assistance to or facilitating the activities of his co-perpetrators); and the accused, even if not
personally effecting the killing, must nevertheless intend this result.37
It is not necessary that the accused play a vital role in the alleged crimes. For example, if
a killing is alleged, there is no requirement that the accused inflicted the fatal injury. It is only
required that the accused was a cog in the wheel of events leading up to the final result which is
the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprise. The accused can further that objective
through a variety of means. It is not necessary to show that but for the defendant’s participation,
the criminal act could not have occurred.38
2. Systemic Joint Criminal Enterprise
The second category of joint criminal enterprise, also called systemic joint criminal
enterprise, is in many respects similar to the first category of joint criminal enterprise. Systemic
joint criminal enterprise addresses “concentration camp” like cases.39 The ICTY gathered
support for the application of this type of joint criminal enterprise by pointing to World War II

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at para. 199.

39

Id. at para. 202.
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cases that prosecuted participants in Nazi concentration camps.40 In those cases, the notion of
common purpose was applied to situations where the offences charged were alleged to have been
committed by members of military or administrative units such as those running concentration
camps (i.e., by groups of persons acting pursuant to a concerted plan.) In those World War II
cases the accused held some position of authority within the hierarchy of the concentration
camps.41 To be criminally liable under this category of joint criminal enterprise, the defendant
must actively participate in a system of repression, and this fact can be inferred from the
defendant’s position of authority.42 Also, the defendant must have knowledge of the nature of
the system as well as the intent to further the common concerted design to ill-treat the prisoner.43
It is less necessary to prove intent where the defendant’s high rank or authority indicates an
awareness of the common design and intent to participate in the common design.44
3. Extended Joint Criminal Enterprise
The third category of joint criminal enterprise concerns cases involving a common
design, where crimes occurring outside the common design, were natural and foreseeable
consequences of the execution of the common purpose.45 For example, this type of joint
criminal enterprise could occur where a group had a common plan to forcibly remove members
of one ethnic group from a town or village, and in the process of doing so, victims were shot and
killed. The killings were not explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common plan, however,
40
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the killings were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the forced removal of the victims.
Defendants may be found criminal liable if the risk of death occurring was both a predictable
consequence of the execution of the common plan and the defendant was either reckless or
indifferent to that risk.46 This category of joint criminal enterprise was applied to perpetrators of
mob violence in World War II cases such as the Essen Lynching case and the Borkum Island
case. In those cases, there were multiple offenders, and it was unknown or impossible to
ascertain exactly which acts were carried out by which perpetrator, or when the causal link
between each act and the eventual harm is also unknown.47
B. Actus Reus Required for Conviction Under Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine
The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case laid out the actus reus requirements for
conviction under the theory of joint criminal enterprise. The same actus reus is required
regardless of which category of joint criminal enterprise is being applied. The actus reus for
criminal liability under a theory of joint criminal enterprise is as follows: (i) A plurality of
persons. (ii) The existence of a common plan, design or purpose, which amounts to or involves
the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. (iii) Participation of the accused in the
common design involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute.48
First, with regard to the plurality requirement, there is no requirement that the group of
persons be organized in a military, political or administrative structure.49 The plurality of
persons can occur in any form, whether it is formal or informal, so long as the group includes
more than one person. Second, regarding the common design requirement, there is no necessity
46
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that the design has been previously arranged or formulated. The common plan or purpose may
materialize extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in
unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.50 Finally, with respect to the participation
requirement, the participation need not involve commission of a specific crime provided for in
the ICTY Statute (for example, murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), but may take the form
of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or purpose.51
C. Mens Rea Required for Conviction Under Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine
By contrast, the mens rea element differs according to the category of common design
under consideration. With regard to basic joint criminal enterprise, an accused must have intent
to perpetrate a certain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators).52
With regard to systemic joint criminal enterprise, personal knowledge of the system of ill
treatment is required (whether proved by express testimony or a matter of reasonable inference
from the accused's position of authority), as well as the intent to further this common concerted
system of ill treatment.53 Regarding extended joint criminal enterprise, the intention to
participate in and further the criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to
contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission of a crime by the
group is required.54 In addition, responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the
common plan arises only if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a
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crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly
took that risk.55
When applying the third category of joint criminal enterprise, it is important to note that
more than just negligence is required to possess the proper mens rea. What is required is a state
of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware
that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took
that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also called advertent
recklessness in some national legal systems).56
The ICTY has stated that where a crime is being prosecuted under a theory joint criminal
enterprise, "the prosecution must establish that the accused shared with the person who
personally perpetrated the crime the state of mind required for that crime."57 When the
prosecution seeks to apply the third category of joint criminal enterprise, and "the crime charged
went beyond the object of the joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution needs to establish only
that the accused was aware that the further crime was a possible consequence in the execution of
that enterprise and that, with that awareness, he participated in that enterprise."58
D. Joint Criminal Enterprise v. Command Responsibility
When the ICTY decides to prosecute an accused war criminal, the tribunal must make a
basic legal choice between prosecuting that individual under a theory of Joint criminal enterprise,
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or under a theory of command responsibility.59 Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute provides for
command (superior) responsibility as a form of individual criminal liability. Article 7(3) reads;
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility
if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.60
Individuals can be found guilty of criminal conduct in spite of the fact that the acts were carried
out by subordinates.61
E. Joint Criminal Enterprise v. Aiding and Abetting
It is important to distinguish criminal liability as a co-perpetrator under a theory of joint
criminal enterprise from criminal liability for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes.
These two forms of liability are similar in some respects, however, they are fundamentally
different forms of criminal liability. Both forms of liability are prosecuted under Article 7(1) of
the ICTY Statute.62 Article 7(1) states that “[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
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crime.” (emphasis added)63 Co-perpetration under a theory of joint criminal enterprise doctrine
is different from aiding and abetting in the degree of seriousness of the offense as well as the
requisite actus reus and mens rea.64
G. Termination of Conspiracy: an Analogy to Joint Criminal Enterprise
1. Conspiracy
There is little information available concerning termination of a joint criminal enterprise
or termination of an individual’s membership in a joint criminal enterprise. The crime of
conspiracy provides the closest analogy. Conspiracy resembles joint criminal enterprise doctrine
in many ways. Both doctrines seek to expand the potential liability of defendants far beyond
their physical perpetration of crimes and both doctrines attach the criminal liability of the
defendants to the acts committed within the scope of the enterprise.65
The crime of conspiracy, like other crimes, requires certain acts as well as a certain
mental state. There needs to be: (1) an agreement between two or more persons, which
constitutes the act; and (2) an intent thereby to achieve a certain objective which, under the
common law definition, is the doing of either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.
Many U.S. jurisdictions also require that the accused has committed some overt act in
63
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furtherance of the conspiracy. This is usually viewed as an evidentiary requirement rather than
another element of the offense.66
The agreement is said to be the “essence” of the conspiracy.67 There continues to be some
uncertainty as to the exact meaning of agreement in the context of conspiracy. However, it is
certain that the meaning of agreement in this context is more lax than the meaning elsewhere, for
example, the agreement or “meeting of the minds” concept in the context of contracts.68 There is
no requirement that the agreement be explicit. Instead, the agreement can be inferred from the
facts and circumstances of the case.69 It is not necessary that each conspirator agree to commit
or facilitate every part of the substantive offense. One can be a conspirator by agreeing to
facilitate only some of the acts leading up to the substantive offense.70
Regarding the second element, that of intent (the mens rea required to commit
conspiracy), this must be understood as intent to achieve the objective of the agreement rather
than intent to agree. The intent to agree is so closely related to the agreement (the actus reus),
which is mental in nature, it cannot be said to constitute a separate element of the offense.71 To
be guilty of conspiracy, the accused must have the intent to achieve the objective of the
agreement. This means that the accused must have the intent to achieve a particular result that is
criminal.72 This intent does not have to be so particular that the conspirator has in mind a
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particular time, place and victim, but the intent must relate to a particular type of criminal
activity.73
Under common law, the crime of conspiracy was punishable even though the
conspirators committed no act beyond making the agreement. This is still the rule in the absence
of a statute providing otherwise.74 Most U.S. States, however, require that an overt act in
furtherance of the plan be proven for all or specified conspiratorial objectives. Often, this overt
act must constitute a “substantial step” towards the commission of the crime.75 Under Federal
U.S. law, an overt act is specifically required by the general conspiracy statute.76 This indicates
that in the U.S., the absence of an overt act requirement in subsequently enacted federal
conspiracy statutes reflects Congress’ intent to follow the common law standard, not requiring an
overt act.77
The purpose of having an overt act requirement in a conspiracy is simply to demonstrate
that the conspiracy is at work, and it is neither a “project resting solely in the minds of the
conspirators nor a fully completed operation no longer in existence.”78 Therefore, the overt act
must be the substantive offense, which was the object of the conspiracy, but may not be simply a
part of the act of agreement.79 U.S. courts have held that the overt act must be a step towards the
execution of the conspiracy, an act that tends to carry out the conspiracy, or a step in preparation
73

United States v. Gallishaw, 428 F.2d 760 (2nd Cir. 1970). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 16]

74

United States v. Sassi, 966 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1992). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17]

75

LaFave at 626.

76

18 U.S.C.A. § 371. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 50]

77

United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

78

Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]

79

LaFave at 627.

20

for affecting the object. Thus, if the agreement has been established but the object has not been
attained, virtually any act will satisfy the overt act requirement. 80
2. The Pinkerton Doctrine: The Extended Form of Conspiracy
In the United States, it is possible for a conspirator to be held responsible for crimes
committed by his co-conspirators as long as such crimes were in furtherance of the agreement
and were reasonably foreseeable. This doctrine closely resembles the extended form of joint
criminal enterprise.81 This rule of liability was established by the Supreme Court in 1946 in
Pinkerton v. United States.82 The crimes themselves do not have to have been agreed upon,
intended or even discussed. Liability attaches when it was reasonably foreseeable to the accused
that the crime would be committed.83 This doctrine allows the government to hold an accused
criminally liable for all reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators regardless of actual
knowledge, intent, or participation. Thus, if the government cannot prove an accused’s guilt
relating to a substantive crime, it only needs to prove that the accused was a party to the
conspiracy where the commission of the substantive crime was reasonably foreseeable.84
Pinkerton liability or any similar doctrine has not been embraced in any civil law
jurisdictions.85 Today, many U.S. states, as well as the Model Penal Code, have rejected
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Pinkerton liability, although it still plays role in federal prosecutions.86 U.S. courts have
recognized that Pinkerton liability, which is predicated on foreseeable but unintended crimes,
poses problems of fundamental fairness in cases where the link between an individual's
wrongdoing and criminal liability is highly attenuated.87 United States Federal Courts have
refused to extend the Pinkerton doctrine to convictions of first-degree murder. In United States
v. Cherry, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that if they were to apply Pinkerton liability to
the defendant (who was involved in a conspiracy to distribute drugs), the government would
apparently render every minor drug distribution co-conspirator, regardless of knowledge, the
extent of the conspiracy, its history of violence, and like factors, liable for first degree murder.
The Court held that such a result is incompatible with the due process limitations.88 The
Pinkerton doctrine, the closest analogy to extended joint criminal enterprise, has far greater
limitations placed on it than does the application of extended joint criminal enterprise in the
ICTY.89
3. Withdrawal from Conspiracy
It is possible for a member of a conspiracy limit his criminal liability by withdrawing
from the conspiracy. An accused may attempt to establish his withdrawal as a defense for
substantive crimes subsequently committed by co-conspirators. Or, the accused may seek to
prove his withdrawal to show that he cannot be held liable because the statute of limitations has
run.90
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Conspiracy law sets a tough standard for withdrawal.91 A defendant must show "that he
has taken affirmative steps . . . to disavow or to defeat the objectives of the conspiracy; and . . .
that he made a reasonable effort to communicate those acts to his co-conspirators or that he
disclosed the scheme to law enforcement."92 The "disclosed the scheme to law enforcement"
prong of withdrawal aids information extraction because it lowers the sentences of those who
provide such information to authorities.93 The "communicate [to] co-conspirators" prong,
permitting withdrawal without informing law enforcement, destabilizes conspiracies in two
ways. Because defection from groups is more common when members believe their activities
are coming to a close, the withdrawal of one member can prompt defection from the others, thus
weakening the group and providing additional opportunities for information extraction.94
Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner
reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to
establish withdrawal.95 The mere cessation of activity in furtherance of conspiracy is insufficient
to constitute withdrawal from the conspiracy.96
In the United States, withdrawal from a conspiracy ends liability for further substantive
offenses, but not the initial liability for the offense of conspiring or other substantive crimes
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already committed while the person was a member.97 Furthermore, conspiracy is an inchoate
offense that is complete regardless of whether the object of the conspiracy is achieved,
withdrawal is impossible once an overt act is committed.98 However, an accused could
successfully escape criminal liability by showing that he withdrew before an overt act or
substantive crime was committed by a co-conspirator.99
4. Termination of Conspiracy
It is also possible for a member of a conspiracy limit his criminal liability by showing
that the existence of the conspiracy was terminated. An accused may raise this defense to
escape liability for substantive crimes occurring after the termination of the conspiracy. Or, the
accused may argue that a conspiracy has been terminated because the statute of limitations
begins running once the termination is complete.100
There are two ways in which a conspiracy can terminate. A conspiracy can terminate
upon the completion of the last overt act, or when the primary purpose of the conspiracy has
been accomplished.101 Regarding termination after the last overt act, although the result of a
conspiracy may be continuing, the conspiracy does not thereby become a continuing one.
Continuity of action to produce the unlawful result and continuous co-operation of the
conspirators is necessary. The statute of limitations, unless suspended, runs from the last overt
act during the existence of the conspiracy. The overt acts averred and proved thus marks the
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duration of the conspiracy.102 Regarding termination after the purpose of the conspiracy has
been accomplished, once the goal that is the reason for the conspiracy’s existence has been
realized, the conspiracy is terminated and the statute of limitations begins to run.103
H. Conspiracy v. Joint Criminal Enterprise
Joint criminal enterprise doctrine, while similar to conspiracy, is a distinct and very
different doctrine. Judge Hunt of Australia, a leading authority on JCE at the ICTY, has
characterized the argument that joint criminal enterprise is a form of conspiracy as "entirely
fallacious because conspiracy is a crime unto itself and not a mode of individual criminal
responsibility for the commission of a crime."104 Joint criminal enterprise is a form of
commission pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute. Criminal liability does not attach because of
an individual’s membership in the joint criminal enterprise, rather, an individual can be held
liable for crimes committed under the ICTY Statute through a theory of joint criminal
enterprise.105
The ICTY Appeals chamber has stated that while mere agreement is sufficient to
establish criminal liability in the case of conspiracy, the liability of a member of a joint criminal
enterprise will depend on the commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that enterprise.106
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Also, the very concept of joint criminal enterprise presupposes that its participants, other than the
principal perpetrator(s) of the crimes committed, share the perpetrators' joint criminal intent.107
Joint criminal enterprise doctrine has even fewer limits than domestic conspiracy law,
and it provides the prosecutor with the ability to expand the boundaries of the range of crimes for
which an individual may be held responsible.108 Thus, once an accused has been found to satisfy
the actus reus and mens rea requirements for participation in a joint criminal enterprise, his
criminal liability is established and it is not possible to raise withdrawal or termination as a
defense.
1. Withdrawal from a Joint Criminal Enterprise
In almost every instance, it is not possible for an accused to successfully escape liability
under joint criminal enterprise by showing his withdrawal. Under joint criminal enterprise, an
individual may be held responsible for all crimes committed pursuant to the existence of a
common plan or design.109 So long as the accused meets the mens rea and actus reus
requirements, withdrawal will not allow him to escape liability from crimes committed after his
withdrawal.
Also, in the context of conspiracy, withdrawal is often used as a defense to show that the
accused cannot be held liable due to the statute of limitations.110 Withdrawal cannot serve this
purpose within the ICTY. The ICTY Statute provides jurisdiction for crimes delineated in the
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Statute occurring since 1991 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.111 An accused cannot
escape criminal liability under joint criminal enterprise by showing that the statute of limitations
has run since the time of his withdrawal. The Tribunal has jurisdiction over the crime(s) so long
as they occurred since 1991 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. However, it is conceivable
that an accused could escape liability by showing that he withdrew from the joint criminal
enterprise before the date on which the Tribunal’s jurisdiction begins.
The exception to the inability to withdraw from a joint criminal enterprise occurs in the
context of systemic joint criminal enterprise. In cases involving concentration camp like
scenarios, the ICTY limits the liability of co-perpetrators in a joint criminal enterprise to those
times when the accused is a participant in the system of ill treatment.112 In The Prosecutor v.
Kvocka, Kvocka was accused, via the joint criminal enterprise doctrine, of committing various
crimes at the Omarska Prison Camp. The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s
decisions that while Kvocka's physical presence in the camp at the time the crimes were
committed was necessary for him to be held criminally responsible, the Tribunal was excluded
from finding Kvocka liable for the crimes committed before he arrived at the camp and after he
left.113 Thus, it is possible for an individual accused of co-perpetration through a theory of
systemic joint criminal enterprise to escape liability for crimes committed before he arrived at
the prison camp as well as crimes committed after he left or “withdrew” from the camp.
However the accused need not be present at the camp at the time the crimes were committed to
be held criminally liable.
111
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2. Termination of a Joint Criminal Enterprise
Similar to the defense of withdrawal from a joint criminal enterprise, termination is not
an effective defense against criminal liability. An accused cannot escape criminal liability by
asserting that the joint criminal enterprise had terminated prior to the commission of certain
crimes. In The Prosecutor v. Martic, the Prosecutor argued, and the Trial Chamber agreed, that
an accused “can be held responsible for the effect of criminal actions in which he participated
that extend beyond the existence of the joint criminal enterprise.”114 The fact that the existence
of a joint criminal enterprise ends on a certain date does not mean that member of the enterprise
cannot be held criminally liable for the continuing effects of that enterprise.
Also, the defense of termination is equally ineffective in regards to the statute of
limitations. The ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes provided for in the Statute occurring since
1991 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.115 An accused cannot escape criminal liability
under joint criminal enterprise by showing that the statute of limitations has run since the
termination of the joint criminal enterprise.
I. How Can an Accused Show That a Joint Criminal Enterprise Did Not Exist?
The defenses of withdrawal from a joint criminal enterprise and termination of a joint
criminal enterprise are severely limited in their effectiveness in the ICTY. The following
discussion, while not exactly addressing the question presented, will hopefully be helpful in
understanding how an individual can escape criminal liability by showing that a joint criminal
enterprise did not exist. The next section discusses ways in which an accused can escape
criminal liability by showing that he was not a participant in a joint criminal enterprise.
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1. Brdjanin Decision Limited the Application of the Joint Criminal
Enterprise Doctrine to Situations Where There Is a Nexus Between the
Accused and the Physical Perpetrators of the Crime(s)
In The Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, the Trial Chamber changed its conceptualization of the
joint criminal enterprise doctrine and limited the situations in which the doctrine can be applied.
The controversy arose were the mens rea of the accused and the second actus reus requirement
(requiring a common plan, design or purpose which involves the commission of a crime
provided for in the Statute) were applied together. The Trial Chamber found that while it is not
necessary to prove that every member of the joint criminal enterprise intended every criminal
objective of the enterprise, the prosecutor must prove that, between the member of the joint
criminal enterprise physically committing the material crime charged and the person held
responsible under the joint criminal enterprise for that crime, there was a common plan to
commit at least that particular crime. This requires a showing that there was an agreement
between the accused and the physical perpetrators of the crimes. The Trial Chamber defined
"physical perpetrators of crimes" as those who carry out the crimes' actus reus.116
Brdjanin was arrested on July 6, 1999.117 He was charged with the crimes of genocide;
complicity in genocide; crimes against humanity by persecution, extermination, torture,
deportation, and inhumane acts; grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions by willful killing,
torture, and unlawful and wanton extensive destruction and appropriation of property; and
violation of the laws or customs of war by wanton destruction or devastation of villages and
religious institutions. 118 The Indictment alleged basic joint criminal enterprise under Article
116
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7(1) for all counts. It also alleged extended joint criminal enterprise under Article 7(1) for all
counts except deportation and forcible transfer. Brdjanin's liability depended on whether the
joint criminal enterprise's other members included the physical perpetrators of crimes.119
According to the indictment, the joint criminal enterprise's other members included Momir Talic,
other Krajina Crisis Staff members, the Bosnian Serb political leadership, the Krajina Assembly,
its Executive Committee, municipal crisis staffs, army personnel, Serb paramilitary forces, and
"others."120 The Trial Chamber concluded that army personnel, Bosnian Serb police, Serb
paramilitary groups, Bosnian Serb armed civilians, and unidentified individuals were the only
physical perpetrators of crimes among those listed. Other potential physical perpetrators of the
crimes were not pleaded in the Indictment, therefore, Brdjanin's liability under joint criminal
enterprise depended on finding the necessary agreement between Brdjanin and the relevant
physical perpetrators who were properly pleaded, namely the army personnel and Serb
paramilitary forces.121
In a controversial move, the Trial Chamber stated that it is not sufficient to prove an
understanding or an agreement to commit a crime between the Accused and a person in charge or
in control of a military or paramilitary unit committing a crime.122 According to the Trial
Chamber, an accused can only be held criminally responsible under a joint criminal enterprise if
the Prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt that he had an understanding or entered into
an agreement with the relevant physical perpetrators to commit the particular crime eventually
perpetrated or if the crime perpetrated by the relevant physical perpetrators is a natural and
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foreseeable consequence of the crime agreed upon by the accused and the relevant physical
perpetrators.123 Though Brdjanin's actions facilitated or contributed to the commission of crimes
by others or assisted in forming those persons' criminal intent, they did not successfully establish
the required agreement. The Chamber concluded that no direct evidence existed to satisfy the
agreement requirement.124
The Trial Chamber addressed whether it was possible to infer agreement from the
circumstances. The Trial Chamber rejected the inference of the necessary agreement, "given the
physical and structural remoteness between the Accused and the Relevant Physical Perpetrators
and the fact that the Relevant Physical Perpetrators in most cases have not even been personally
identified."125 The Trial Chamber found that the evidence inadequate for every joint criminal
enterprise member, the Chamber acquitted Brdjanin of all charges under joint criminal
enterprise. The Trial Chamber observed generally that joint criminal enterprise was
inappropriate to describe Brdjanin's responsibility given the case's extraordinarily broad nature
and that Brdjanin was so structurally remote from the commission of the crimes charged.126
Following this controversial shift in the conceptualization of joint criminal enterprise
doctrine, these new propositions appear to have become accepted law: (1) for joint criminal
enterprise, the prosecutor must prove direct, mutual agreement between the accused and the
actual physical perpetrators of the crimes; (2) proving that the accused shared the joint criminal
enterprise's criminal intent with the superior of the physical perpetrators does not satisfy the
requirement; and (3) the joint criminal enterprises anticipated by Tadic are smaller in scale than
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the one in Brdjanin. The first two propositions restrict joint criminal enterprise's ability to
describe individual responsibility for mass crimes. The third proposition suggests that the
Chamber's overall attitude regarding joint criminal enterprise size motivated the case's
outcome.127
2. An Accused Can Escape Liability Under a Theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise
Where the Prosecution Does Not Sufficiently Plead the Identities of the
Members of that Enterprise
Joint criminal enterprise doctrine cannot be invoked against an accused where the coperpetrators in the enterprise cannot be identified, nor can the doctrine be applied where the
purpose of the enterprise cannot be ascertained. In The Prosecutor v. Bala, the Trial Chamber
found that there was insufficient evidence to find that a joint criminal enterprise existed. The
Prosecution alleged the existence of a joint criminal enterprise whereby Bala, along with others,
engaged in various criminal acts. The Trial Chamber declined to find the existence of a joint
criminal enterprise because they were unable to ascertain the identities of the participants other
than Bala.128
The Indictment charged Bala with individual criminal liability under Article 7(1) of the
Statute for allegedly committing, planning, instigating, ordering, or otherwise aiding and abetting
the alleged crimes, including through his participation in a joint criminal enterprise. He was
alleged to have personally participated in the enforcement of the detention of civilians in the
Lapusnik prison camp, in their interrogation, assault, mistreatment and torture, as well as in the
murder of detainees.129 According to the Trial Chamber, there was absolutely no evidence to
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establish how, or on whose decision, the prison camp came to be established, or how or on
whose orders Bala took up duties at the camp. While it would be possible to infer that there must
have existed some form of joint criminal enterprise which was comprised of unknown persons
who were members of the KLA, that is too general and it cannot provide a sufficient
categorization to identify the participants in the joint criminal enterprise.130
Due to the lack of evidence demonstrating that a group of individuals, whose identities
could be established at least by reference to their category as a group, furthered a common plan,
and due to the lack of evidence as to the scope of any such plan, the Trial Chamber found that
the principal elements of joint criminal enterprise had not been established. The Prosecution was
unable to establish beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of a joint criminal enterprise.131
However, Hardin Bala was found to be criminally liable for his direct involvement in crimes
committed in the Lapusnik prison camp.132
J. How Can an Accused Show that He Was Not a Member of a Joint Criminal
Enterprise?
1. An accused can show that he was not a member of a joint criminal
enterprise by showing that he lacked the necessary intent and his criminal
liability only raises to that of an aider and abettor
In Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, on appeal, the defense successfully showed that the
accused lacked the necessary mens rea to sustain a finding of criminal responsibility as a coperpetrator under a theory of joint criminal enterprise. Following his conviction by the Trial
Chamber as a member of a joint criminal enterprise in the murder, inhumane acts and
persecution committed during the Drina River incident. Mitar Vasiljevic appealed, with several
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grounds relating to his mens rea for these offences and which the Appeals Chamber considered
together. The Appeals Chamber substituted guilty findings as an aider and abettor (rather than as
a co-perpetrator, as held by the Trial Chamber) for the crimes of murder and persecution.133
The prosecution alleged, and the Trial Chamber agreed, that on 7 June 1992, Vasiljevic,
together with his co-accused Milan Lukic and two other unidentified individuals, forcibly
detained Seven Bosnian Muslim civilians in the Vilina Vlas Hotel. The seven captives were
taken to the reception area of the hotel, where Vasiljevic was already present. The Appeals
Chamber found that Vasiljevic guarded the captives and pointed his automatic rifle at them,
preventing any of them from leaving the lobby of the hotel. When one of the Muslims asked
about their fate, this unidentified man answered that they were to be exchanged for some Serb
captives.134 Vasiljevic, along with the others, then transported the seven Bosnian Muslim
civilians to the eastern bank of the Drina River. There, they forced the seven men to line up on
the bank of the river and then opened fire on them. Five of the seven men died as a result of the
shooting.135
The Trial Chamber sought to determine precisely what role Vasiljevic played in the Drina
River incident. The Trial Chamber found that when Vasiljevic left the Vilina Vlas Hotel, he
knew that the men were not to be exchanged for Serb captives, but rather were to be killed. The
evidence of the Accused himself was that he knew that Milan Lukic had committed serious
crimes, including killings. The Trial Chamber rejected Vasiljevic’s evidence that it was only
when the cars transporting the Muslim captives were stopped and the seven men were ordered to
133
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walk towards the bank of the Drina River that he understood that these men were not to be
exchanged, but that they were to be killed.136
The Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that Vasiljevic personally killed any of the victims.137 However, it was nevertheless satisfied that
the only reasonable inference available on the evidence is that Vasiljevic, by his actions,
intended that the seven Muslim men be killed, whether or not he actually carried out any of those
killings himself.138 Regarding the two men who survived the incident, the Trial Chamber was
satisfied that Vasiljevic, by his acts, intended to seriously attack their human dignity and to
inflict serious physical and mental suffering upon them.139 The Trial Chamber found that
Vasiljevic possessed the necessary mens rea to subject him to criminal liability as a coperpetrator under a theory of joint criminal enterprise regarding the Drina River incident. This
finding was subsequently reversed by the Appeals Chamber, which found that Vasiljevic did not
possess the necessary mens rea. Rather, the Appeals Chamber found that Vasiljevic mental state
only subjected him to criminal liability as an aider and abettor to the Drina River incident.140
On appeal, the defense raised several errors relating to the Trial Chamber’s findings of
fact and law. Most alleged errors were dismissed. The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial
Chamber erred when it found that Vasiljevic knew at the hotel that the seven Muslim men were
going to be killed; and that Vasiljevic pointed his gun at the seven Muslim men whilst at the
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hotel. The Appeals Chamber then found that these errors of fact led to a “miscarriage of justice”
and the Trial Chamber incorrectly found that Vasiljevic shared in the intent to kill.141
The Trial Chamber had inferred from Vasiljevic’s actions that he shared the intent to kill.
They were satisfied that “the Accused personally participated in this joint criminal enterprise by
preventing the seven Muslim men from fleeing by pointing a gun at them while they were
detained at the Vilina Vlas Hotel, by escorting them to the bank of the Drina River and pointing
a gun at them to prevent their escape, and by standing behind the Muslim men with his gun
together with the other three offenders shortly before the shooting started.”142 Vasiljevic argued
on appeal that these acts are not conclusive proof of his intention that the seven Muslim men be
killed.143
In order for the Appeals Chamber to find Vasiljevic individually criminally liable as a coperpetrator in a joint criminal enterprise, the Prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he i) voluntarily participated in one aspect of the common purpose; and ii) that
Vasiljevic, even if not personally effecting the crime, nevertheless intended this result.144 When
the Prosecution relies upon proof of the state of mind of an accused by inference, that inference
must be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence. “In other words, the question is
whether no reasonable tribunal could have found that the only reasonable inference from the
evidence was that the Appellant by his actions intended to kill the seven Muslim men.”145
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The Appeals Chamber divided the analysis of Vasiljevic’s intent to kill into two separate
stages of the Drina River incident. First, the Vilina Vlas Hotel stage and second, the time they
arrived near the Drina River immediately before the shootings.146 The Appeals Chamber found
above that the Trial Chamber was reasonable in finding that the Appellant was armed in the
Vilina Vlas Hotel but that it erred in finding that the Appellant pointed his gun at the seven men,
while at the hotel. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber has found that the Trial Chamber erred in
finding that the Appellant had knowledge that the seven Muslim men were to be killed and not
exchanged based on the information provided to him.147
According to the Appeals Chamber, the issue of whether the Vasiljevic pointed his gun at
the seven Muslim men at the hotel is not, as such, a decisive factor in determining the intent of
the Appellant to kill the seven Muslim men. Although he was armed in the hotel and thereby
assisted in preventing the seven Muslim men from fleeing, the Appeals Chamber found that
since the Vasiljevic lacked, at that time, the knowledge that the seven Muslim men were to be
killed, the fact that he prevented the Muslim men from fleeing at the hotel is not decisive as to
whether or not he shared the intent to kill them. Therefore, no reasonable trier of fact could rely
on the actions of the Appellant while at the hotel in support of a conclusion that he had the intent
to kill the seven Muslim men at that time.148
Moving on to the second stage, the Appeals Chamber notes that at the time the cars
containing the seven Muslim men, the perpetrators and Vasiljevic, were parked near the Drina
River, Vasiljevic admits that he knew that the seven Muslim men were to be killed.149 The
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Appeals Chamber considered that when a Chamber is confronted with the task of determining
whether it can infer from the acts of an accused that he or she shared the intent to commit a
crime, special attention must be paid to whether these acts are ambiguous, allowing for several
reasonable inferences. The Appeals Chamber was satisfied that no reasonable tribunal could
have found that the only reasonable inference available on the evidence is that Vasiljevic had the
intent to kill the seven Muslim men. The Trial Chamber found that Vasiljevic assisted Milan
Luki and his men by preventing the seven Muslim men from fleeing. It did not find, however,
that Vasiljevic shot at the Muslim men himself, nor that he exercised control over the firing.
Compared to the involvement of Milan Luki and potentially one or both of the other men, the
participation of Vasiljevic in the overall course of the killings did not reach the same level. The
above-mentioned acts of the Appellant were ambiguous as to whether or not the Appellant
intended that the seven Muslim men be killed. Appeals Chamber, therefore, concludes that the
Trial Chamber erred by finding that the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that
Vasiljevic shared the intent to kill the seven Muslim men.150 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber
erred, since, without the proof the Vasiljevic’s intent, Vasiljevic would not be responsible as a
co- perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise.151
The Appeal Chamber then went on to consider whether Vasiljevic’s conduct should
subject him to criminal liability as an aider and abettor. The Appeals Chamber had already
found that Vasiljevic knew that the seven Muslim men were to be killed; that he walked armed
with the group from the place where they had parked the cars to the Drina River; that he pointed
his gun at the seven Muslim men; and that he stood behind the Muslim men with his gun
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together with the other three offenders shortly before the shooting started. The Appeals Chamber
found that the only reasonable inference available on the totality of evidence is that Vasiljevic
knew that his acts would assist the commission of the murders. The Appeals Chamber finds that
in preventing the men from escaping on the way to the riverbank and during the shooting,
Vasiljevic’s actions had a "substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime."152 The Appeals
Chamber found that the acts of the Vasiljevic were specifically directed to assist the perpetration
of the murders and the inhumane acts and his support had a substantial effect upon the
perpetration of the crimes. For this reason, The Appeals Chamber found Vasiljevic guilty for
aiding and abetting murder.153
2. An Accused Can Show that He Was Not a Member of a Joint Criminal
Enterprise by Showing that He Did Not Give a Substantial Enough Contribution
to the Enterprise.
An individual accused of being a member of a joint criminal enterprise could show that
he was not a member of that enterprise by showing that his contribution was not significant
enough to subject him to criminal liability.154 In The Prosecutor v. Kvocka, the Trial Chamber
stated that in order to be found criminally liable for participation in a joint criminal enterprise, an
accused must have carried out acts that substantially assisted or significantly affected the
furtherance of the goals of the enterprise, with the knowledge that his acts or omissions
facilitated the crimes committed through the enterprise. Merely knowing that crimes are being
committed within a system and knowingly participating in that system in a way that substantially
assists or facilitates the commission of a crime or which allows the criminal enterprise to
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function effectively or efficiently would be enough to establish criminal liability. A coperpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise contributes to the commission of the crimes by playing a
role that allows the system or enterprise to continue functioning. Much like the requirement that
an aider and abettor provide substantial assistance to the commission of a crime, the Trial
Chamber applied the same requirement an individual’s participation in a joint criminal
enterprise.155
The Tribunal will take into consideration a variety of factors when determining whether
an accused’s participation in a joint criminal enterprise constitutes a substantial participation.
Those factors include the size of the criminal enterprise, the functions performed, the position of
the individual in the organization or group, and the role of the individual in relation to the
seriousness and the scope of the crimes committed.156
IV. CONCLUSION
Joint criminal enterprise doctrine has proven to be a very useful tool of the ICTY. It is a
means of liability that has been firmly established under customary international law. The ICTY
applies joint criminal enterprise through Article 7(1) of the Statute. Joint criminal enterprise is
very frequently used by ICTY prosecutors as a means of imputing individual criminal liability.
The actus reus and mens rea elements elements necessary for joint criminal enterprise liability to
attach have been firmly established by the Tadic Decision.
Domestic conspiracy law provides the closest analogy to joint criminal enterprise
doctrine. The two doctrines are similar because they seek to expand the potential liability of
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defendants far beyond their physical perpetration of crimes. However, the two doctrines very
different because joint criminal enterprise is a theory of liability used to find individuals liable
for the commission of certain crimes, while conspiracy is a crime unto itself. Furthermore, the
ICTY applies a much looser standard in finding liability under joint criminal enterprise than do
domestic courts in finding liability for conspiracy.
Those accused of conspiracy can limit their liability by showing that they withdrew from
the conspiracy. This can either limit liability for substantive crimes committed after the
individual’s withdrawal or limit liability by showing that the statute of limitations has run since
the individual’s withdrawal. This defense has little application to joint criminal enterprise
doctrine because if an accused is found to have the requisite mens rea and actus reus, he is liable
for all crimes committed pursuant to the common plan. Also, an accused cannot benefit from the
running of a statute of limitations because the ICTY has jurisdiction over any crimes provided
for in the statute that occurred in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. However, an
individual can escape criminal liability for crimes committed in the context of a systemic joint
criminal enterprise by showing that the crimes occurred either before his arrival or after his
departure from the prison camp.
Those accused of conspiracy can also limit their liability by showing that the conspiracy
terminated. This can limit liability for substantive crimes committed after the termination or
limit liability by showing that the statute of limitations has run since the termination of the
conspiracy. This defense has little application to joint criminal enterprise doctrine because if an
accused is found to have the requisite mens rea and actus reus, he is liable for all crimes
committed pursuant to the common plan. Once again, an accused cannot benefit from the
running of a statute of limitations because no such statute of limitation is in place in the ICTY.
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Although withdrawal and termination do not provide effective defenses against the
application of joint criminal enterprise doctrine, there are other ways in which an accused can
show that a joint criminal enterprise did not exist. This can be accomplished by showing a lack
of an agreement between the accused and the physical perpetrators of the crimes. This precedent
was established by the Brdjanin Judgment. There the Trial Chamber significantly restricted the
application of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine. This precedent limits the size of potential
the joint criminal enterprise because now there must be an agreement between the accused and
the people who actually commit the crimes. It is also possible to show that a joint criminal
enterprise does not exist as a matter of law where the Indictment does not sufficiently identify
the member of the enterprise or make their identification possible.
It is possible for an individual to show that he was not a member of a joint criminal
enterprise by showing that he lacked the necessary mens rea to be criminally liable under the
doctrine. In this instance it is still possible to be criminally liable as an aider and abettor. This
scenario is demonstrated by the Vasiljevic Decision. It is also possible for an individual to
demonstrate that he was not a member of a joint criminal enterprise by showing that his
contribution was not substantial enough for criminal liability to attach.
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